Discrete Mathematics 6: Game theory

Discrete Mathematics 6: Game theory topic test

AQA A-Level Further Maths: covers all 3 subtopics

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20 questions, 54 marks

AQA A-Level Further Maths

Discrete Mathematics 6: Game theory topic test

Total 54 marks

Name

Class

Date

  1. 1
    Alex and Beth play a zero-sum game. At the same time, Alex chooses row 1, 2 or 3 and Beth chooses column 1, 2 or 3. The pay-off matrix gives Alex's winnings in points: (436521342)\begin{pmatrix}4&3&6\\5&2&1\\3&4&2\end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Which row is Alex's play-safe strategy?
    [1 mark]
    • ARow 2
    • BRow 1
    • CRow 3
    • DRow 1 and row 3 are equally safe
    (b)
    What is the minimax value, which is the least of the column maximums?
    [1 mark]
    • A3
    • B6
    • C5
    • D4
    (c)
    Show that this game has no stable solution.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 1: 4 marks

  2. 2
    Two ice-cream sellers choose at the same time whether to set up on the beach or in the park. Seller 1's pay-off is the number of customers gained, in hundreds, and Seller 2 loses the same number. If both choose the beach, Seller 1 gains 5. If Seller 1 chooses the beach and Seller 2 the park, Seller 1 gains 8. If Seller 1 chooses the park and Seller 2 the beach, Seller 1 gains 3. If both choose the park, Seller 1 gains 4.
    (a)
    What is the pay-off to Seller 1 when Seller 1 chooses the park and Seller 2 chooses the beach?
    [1 mark]
    • A3
    • B8
    • C4
    • D5
    (b)
    What is Seller 2's play-safe strategy?
    [1 mark]
    • APark
    • BEither, as they are equally safe
    • CBeach
    • DThere is no play-safe strategy
    (c)
    Show that the game has a stable solution and state the value of the game.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 2: 4 marks

  3. 3
    Ines and Jo play a zero-sum game. At the same time, Ines chooses row 1, 2 or 3 and Jo chooses column 1, 2 or 3. The pay-off matrix gives Ines's winnings in points: (253416142)\begin{pmatrix}2&5&3\\4&1&6\\1&4&2\end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Identify a row and a column that can be removed because they are dominated, giving reasons, and write down the reduced matrix.
    [3 marks]
    (b)
    Ines plays row 1 with probability pp and row 2 with probability 1−p1-p in the reduced game. Find the optimal value of pp and the value of the game.
    [4 marks]

    Total for question 3: 7 marks

  4. 4
    Faye and Gus play a zero-sum game. At the same time, Faye chooses row 1, 2 or 3 and Gus chooses column 1, 2 or 3. The pay-off matrix gives Faye's winnings in points, where a negative value is a loss: (10421103−1)\begin{pmatrix}1&0&4\\2&1&1\\0&3&-1\end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    (i) Find each player's play-safe strategy and show that there is no stable solution. (ii) Faye plays rows 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 14\frac14, 12\frac12 and 14\frac14. Find her expected winnings against each of Gus's columns and state what this shows.
    [6 marks]
    (b)
    Gus wants to minimise Faye's winnings. To convert the game to a linear programming problem for Gus, 2 is added to every pay-off. Gus plays column jj with probability qjq_j, the value of the new game is vv and yj=qjvy_j=\frac{q_j}{v}. (i) Formulate the problem as a linear programming problem to maximise P=y1+y2+y3P=y_1+y_2+y_3. (ii) The solution is y1=113y_1=\frac1{13}, y2=213y_2=\frac2{13}, y3=113y_3=\frac1{13}, with P=413P=\frac4{13}. Find Gus's optimal strategy and the value of the original game.
    [6 marks]

    Total for question 4: 12 marks

  5. 5
    Cara and Dev play a zero-sum game. At the same time, Cara chooses row 1, 2 or 3 and Dev chooses column 1, 2 or 3. The pay-off matrix gives Cara's winnings in points: (−1323435−21)\begin{pmatrix}-1&3&2\\3&4&3\\5&-2&1\end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    What is the value of the game for Cara?
    [1 mark]
    • A4
    • B5
    • C3
    • D2
    (b)
    Which choices of row and column give a stable solution?
    [1 mark]
    • ARow 2 and column 3
    • BRow 2 and column 1
    • CRow 3 and column 1
    • DRow 1 and column 3
    (c)
    Show that neither player can improve their pay-off by changing their choice alone from the stable solution.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 5: 4 marks

  6. 6
    Mia and Noor play a zero-sum game. At the same time, Mia chooses row 1 or 2 and Noor chooses column 1, 2 or 3. The pay-off matrix gives Mia's winnings in points: (627156)\begin{pmatrix}6&2&7\\1&5&6\end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Which statement about dominance is correct?
    [1 mark]
    • AColumn 1 is dominated by column 3
    • BRow 1 dominates row 2
    • CNo row or column is dominated
    • DColumn 3 is dominated by column 1
    (b)
    Mia plays row 1 with probability pp and row 2 with probability 1−p1-p. What is her expected pay-off when Noor plays column 2?
    [1 mark]
    • A2+3p2+3p
    • B5−3p5-3p
    • C2p+52p+5
    • D77
    (c)
    Use the dominance in part (a) to reduce the game, and find Mia's optimal strategy and the value of the game.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 6: 4 marks

  7. 7
    Hana and Idris play a zero-sum game. At the same time, Hana chooses row 1, 2 or 3 and Idris chooses column 1, 2 or 3. The pay-off matrix gives Hana's winnings in points, where a negative value is a loss: (−323−14−34−12)\begin{pmatrix}-3&2&3\\-1&4&-3\\4&-1&2\end{pmatrix}. The game is to be converted into a linear programming problem for Idris.
    (a)
    Explain why a constant is added to every pay-off before the conversion, find the smallest whole number that makes every pay-off positive, and write down the new matrix.
    [3 marks]
    (b)
    Idris plays column jj with probability qjq_j. After adding the constant, the value of the game is vv, and yj=qjvy_j=\frac{q_j}{v}. Formulate Idris's problem as a linear programming problem to maximise P=y1+y2+y3P=y_1+y_2+y_3.
    [4 marks]

    Total for question 7: 7 marks

  8. 8
    Kai and Lee play a zero-sum game. At the same time, Kai chooses row 1 or 2 and Lee chooses column 1, 2 or 3. The pay-off matrix gives Kai's winnings in points: (524163)\begin{pmatrix}5&2&4\\1&6&3\end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Kai plays row 1 with probability pp. Find the optimal value of pp and the value of the game, show that Lee should not play column 3, and find Lee's optimal strategy.
    [6 marks]
    (b)
    Lee solves the game as a linear programming problem. Lee plays column jj with probability qjq_j, vv is the value of the game and yj=qjvy_j=\frac{q_j}{v}. (i) Write down the linear programming problem that Lee solves, to maximise P=y1+y2+y3P=y_1+y_2+y_3. (ii) Slack variables rr and ss are added and the simplex algorithm gives a final tableau with rows y1+914y3+314r−114s=17y_1+\frac9{14}y_3+\frac3{14}r-\frac1{14}s=\frac17, y2+1128y3−128r+528s=17y_2+\frac{11}{28}y_3-\frac1{28}r+\frac5{28}s=\frac17 and P+128y3+528r+328s=27P+\frac1{28}y_3+\frac5{28}r+\frac3{28}s=\frac27. Use this to find Lee's optimal strategy and the value of the game.
    [6 marks]

    Total for question 8: 12 marks

End of questions

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