Decision Mathematics 2: Game theory

Decision Mathematics 2: Game theory topic test

Edexcel A-Level Further Maths: covers all 3 subtopics

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20 questions, 54 marks

Edexcel A-Level Further Maths

Decision Mathematics 2: Game theory topic test

Total 54 marks

Name

Class

Date

  1. 1
    Two rival bakeries, Crust and Crumb, each choose one of three pricing strategies. The game is zero-sum and the pay-off matrix shows Crust's gain in daily sales (in hundreds of pounds). Crust chooses the rows R1,R2,R3\mathrm{R}_1, \mathrm{R}_2, \mathrm{R}_3 and Crumb chooses the columns C1,C2,C3\mathrm{C}_1, \mathrm{C}_2, \mathrm{C}_3. The matrix is (364172−240)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 6 & 4 \\ 1 & 7 & 2 \\ -2 & 4 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    What is Crust's play-safe strategy?
    [1 mark]
    • AR1\mathrm{R}_1
    • BR2\mathrm{R}_2
    • CR3\mathrm{R}_3
    • DC1\mathrm{C}_1
    (b)
    What is the value of the game to Crust?
    [1 mark]
    • A77
    • B44
    • C33
    • D11
    (c)
    Show that the game has a stable solution.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 1: 4 marks

  2. 2
    Two ice-cream sellers, Ayla and Bran, each choose one of three pitches on a beach. The game is zero-sum and the pay-off matrix shows Ayla's change in daily takings (in pounds). Ayla chooses the rows A1,A2,A3\mathrm{A}_1, \mathrm{A}_2, \mathrm{A}_3 and Bran chooses the columns B1,B2,B3\mathrm{B}_1, \mathrm{B}_2, \mathrm{B}_3. The matrix is (1−23−12−401−1)\begin{pmatrix} 1 & -2 & 3 \\ -1 & 2 & -4 \\ 0 & 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    What is the row maximin?
    [1 mark]
    • A−4-4
    • B11
    • C−2-2
    • D−1-1
    (b)
    Which pitch is Bran's play-safe strategy?
    [1 mark]
    • AB2\mathrm{B}_2
    • BB1\mathrm{B}_1
    • CB3\mathrm{B}_3
    • DA3\mathrm{A}_3
    (c)
    Explain why this game has no stable solution.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 2: 4 marks

  3. 3
    Two bike-hire firms, Pedal and Quick, each choose a pricing policy. Pedal chooses one of two policies P1,P2\mathrm{P}_1, \mathrm{P}_2 (rows) and Quick chooses one of three policies Q1,Q2,Q3\mathrm{Q}_1, \mathrm{Q}_2, \mathrm{Q}_3 (columns). The game is zero-sum and the pay-off matrix shows Pedal's gain in weekly bookings: (4−12−231)\begin{pmatrix} 4 & -1 & 2 \\ -2 & 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Pedal plays P1\mathrm{P}_1 with probability pp and P2\mathrm{P}_2 with probability 1−p1-p. Find the value of pp that maximises Pedal's smallest expected gain, and find the value of the game.
    [3 marks]
    (b)
    Find Quick's optimal mixed strategy, and explain why Quick should never play Q3\mathrm{Q}_3.
    [4 marks]

    Total for question 3: 7 marks

  4. 4
    Two delivery apps, Dash and Zoom, compete for customers. Each month Dash chooses one of three promotions D1,D2,D3\mathrm{D}_1, \mathrm{D}_2, \mathrm{D}_3 (rows) and Zoom chooses one of three promotions Z1,Z2,Z3\mathrm{Z}_1, \mathrm{Z}_2, \mathrm{Z}_3 (columns). The game is zero-sum and the pay-off matrix shows Dash's gain in market share (percentage points): (3−14−243122)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & -1 & 4 \\ -2 & 4 & 3 \\ 1 & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Use a dominance argument to reduce the game, and then find Zoom's optimal mixed strategy and the value of the game to Dash.
    [6 marks]
    (b)
    Dash wants to find its own optimal strategy using the Simplex algorithm. Dash plays Di\mathrm{D}_i with probability pip_i. Add a suitable constant to every entry of the matrix and let VV be the value of the new game. Formulate Dash's problem as a linear programming problem in which P=VP=V is maximised, stating the objective, all the constraints and the non-negativity conditions.
    [6 marks]

    Total for question 4: 12 marks

  5. 5
    Two railway companies, Alto and Brisk, each choose a timetable strategy. The game is zero-sum and the pay-off matrix shows Alto's gain in daily passengers (in hundreds). Alto chooses the rows A1,A2,A3\mathrm{A}_1, \mathrm{A}_2, \mathrm{A}_3 and Brisk chooses the columns B1,B2,B3\mathrm{B}_1, \mathrm{B}_2, \mathrm{B}_3. The matrix is (314243021)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 & 4 \\ 2 & 4 & 3 \\ 0 & 2 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Which of Brisk's strategies can be removed by dominance?
    [1 mark]
    • AB1\mathrm{B}_1
    • BB2\mathrm{B}_2
    • CB3\mathrm{B}_3
    • DNo column can be removed
    (b)
    Which matrix remains when all dominated strategies have been removed?
    [1 mark]
    • A(3124)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 \\ 2 & 4 \end{pmatrix}
    • B(314243)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 & 4 \\ 2 & 4 & 3 \end{pmatrix}
    • C(3102)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 \\ 0 & 2 \end{pmatrix}
    • D(1443)\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 4 \\ 4 & 3 \end{pmatrix}
    (c)
    Alto plays A1\mathrm{A}_1 with probability pp in the reduced game. Find the optimal value of pp and the value of the game.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 5: 4 marks

  6. 6
    Ria and Cal play a zero-sum game in which Ria chooses the rows and Cal chooses the columns. The pay-off matrix shows Ria's gain and is (−234−1)\begin{pmatrix} -2 & 3 \\ 4 & -1 \end{pmatrix}. Cal plays column jj with probability qjq_j, and the game is to be solved as a linear programming problem using the Simplex algorithm.
    (a)
    What is the smallest whole number that can be added to every entry so that no entry is negative?
    [1 mark]
    • A11
    • B22
    • C33
    • D44
    (b)
    After the constant is added, let VV be the value of the new game and yj=qjVy_j=\dfrac{q_j}{V}. Cal's problem is to maximise P=y1+y2P=y_1+y_2. Which constraint comes from the first row of the new matrix?
    [1 mark]
    • A−2y1+3y2≤1-2y_1+3y_2\le1
    • B5y1≤15y_1\le1
    • Cy1+y2≤1y_1+y_2\le1
    • D5y2≤15y_2\le1
    (c)
    The optimal solution of this linear programme is y1=215y_1=\frac{2}{15} and y2=15y_2=\frac15. Find Cal's optimal mixed strategy and the value of the original game.
    [2 marks]

    Total for question 6: 4 marks

  7. 7
    Two farm shops, Hill and Dale, compete for customers. Hill chooses one of two offers H1,H2\mathrm{H}_1, \mathrm{H}_2 (rows) and Dale chooses one of four offers D1,D2,D3,D4\mathrm{D}_1, \mathrm{D}_2, \mathrm{D}_3, \mathrm{D}_4 (columns). The game is zero-sum and the pay-off matrix shows Hill's gain in weekly customers (in tens): (51421404)\begin{pmatrix} 5 & 1 & 4 & 2 \\ 1 & 4 & 0 & 4 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Hill plays H1\mathrm{H}_1 with probability pp and H2\mathrm{H}_2 with probability 1−p1-p. Find Hill's optimal value of pp and the value of the game.
    [3 marks]
    (b)
    Find Dale's optimal mixed strategy, explaining why Dale never plays D1\mathrm{D}_1 or D4\mathrm{D}_4.
    [4 marks]

    Total for question 7: 7 marks

  8. 8
    Two gyms, Atlas and Beam, compete for new members. Atlas chooses one of three campaigns A,B,C\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C} (rows) and Beam chooses one of three campaigns X,Y,Z\mathrm{X}, \mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{Z} (columns). The game is zero-sum and the pay-off matrix shows Atlas's gain in new members per month: (523145213)\begin{pmatrix} 5 & 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 4 & 5 \\ 2 & 1 & 3 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Use dominance to reduce the game to a 2×22\times2 game, and hence find the optimal mixed strategy for each gym and the value of the game.
    [6 marks]
    (b)
    Beam plays X,Y,Z\mathrm{X}, \mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{Z} with probabilities q1,q2,q3q_1, q_2, q_3 and VV is the value of the game. Let yj=qjVy_j=\dfrac{q_j}{V}. Formulate Beam's problem as a linear programme in y1,y2,y3y_1, y_2, y_3 that can be solved by the Simplex algorithm, and use your answer to (a) to state the optimal value of PP and of y1,y2,y3y_1, y_2, y_3.
    [6 marks]

    Total for question 8: 12 marks

End of questions

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