Dominance and mixed strategies

Dominance and mixed strategies Test

Spec DF4–DF5 · AQA A-Level Further Maths: Subtopic test

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10 questions, 27 marks

AQA A-Level Further Maths

Dominance and mixed strategies

Total 27 marks

Name

Class

Date

  1. 1
    Rowan and Colin play a zero-sum game. The pay-off matrix for Rowan is (324152435)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 2 & 4 \\ 1 & 5 & 2 \\ 4 & 3 & 5 \end{pmatrix}. Rows are Rowan's strategies and columns are Colin's. Rowan wants to maximise his pay-off and Colin wants to minimise it.
    (a)
    Which statement about dominance in this game is correct?
    [1 mark]
    • ARow 1 dominates row 3
    • BRow 2 dominates row 1
    • CRow 3 dominates row 1
    • DRow 2 dominates row 3
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: C
    (b)
    All dominated rows and columns are removed. What is the reduced matrix?
    [1 mark]
    • A(3243)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 2 \\ 4 & 3 \end{pmatrix}
    • B(1245)\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ 4 & 5 \end{pmatrix}
    • C(324435)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 2 & 4 \\ 4 & 3 & 5 \end{pmatrix}
    • D(1543)\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 5 \\ 4 & 3 \end{pmatrix}
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: D
    (c)
    Explain why Colin will never play column 3.
    [2 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    M1: compares columns 1 and 3, e.g. 3≤43\leq4, 1≤21\leq2, 4≤54\leq5
    A1: Colin minimises Rowan's pay-off, so column 1 is at least as good for Colin as column 3 whatever Rowan does, so column 3 is dominated

    Total for question 1: 4 marks

  2. 2
    Rowan and Colin play a zero-sum game with pay-off matrix for Rowan (5124)\begin{pmatrix} 5 & 1 \\ 2 & 4 \end{pmatrix}. The game has no stable solution. Rowan chooses row 1 with probability pp and row 2 with probability 1−p1-p, to maximise his smallest expected pay-off.
    (a)
    What is the optimal value of pp?
    [1 mark]
    • A12\frac12
    • B13\frac13
    • C23\frac23
    • D14\frac14
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: B
    (b)
    What is the value of the game?
    [1 mark]
    • A33
    • B72\frac72
    • C22
    • D52\frac52
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: A
    (c)
    Find Colin's optimal strategy.
    [2 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    M1: Colin plays column 1 with probability qq and equates expected pay-offs for the two rows, 4q+1=4−2q4q+1=4-2q
    A1:
    q=12q=\frac12, so Colin plays each column with probability 12\frac12

    Total for question 2: 4 marks

  3. 3
    Rowan and Colin play a zero-sum game with pay-off matrix for Rowan (251416)\begin{pmatrix} 2 & 5 & 1 \\ 4 & 1 & 6 \end{pmatrix}. The game has no stable solution. Rowan chooses row 1 with probability pp and row 2 with probability 1−p1-p. Colin has three strategies, columns 1, 2 and 3.
    (a)
    Write down Rowan's expected pay-off, in terms of pp, when Colin plays each of columns 1, 2 and 3.
    [3 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    B1: column 1: 2p+4(1−p)=4−2p2p+4(1-p)=4-2p
    B1: column 2:
    5p+(1−p)=1+4p5p+(1-p)=1+4p
    B1: column 3:
    p+6(1−p)=6−5pp+6(1-p)=6-5p
    (b)
    Use these expressions to find Rowan's optimal strategy and the value of the game, and show that Colin should never play column 3.
    [4 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    M1: Rowan's best guaranteed pay-off is where the lowest line is highest, i.e. equates the lines for columns 1 and 2, 4−2p=1+4p4-2p=1+4p
    A1:
    p=12p=\frac12, so Rowan plays each row with probability 12\frac12
    A1: value of the game is
    33
    B1: at
    p=12p=\frac12 column 3 gives 6−52=3.5>36-\frac52=3.5>3, so it is worse for Colin than columns 1 and 2, and he never plays it

    Total for question 3: 7 marks

  4. 4
    Rowan and Colin play a zero-sum game with pay-off matrix for Rowan (364728253)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 6 & 4 \\ 7 & 2 & 8 \\ 2 & 5 & 3 \end{pmatrix}. Rows are Rowan's strategies and columns are Colin's.
    (a)
    Use dominance to reduce the game to a 2×22\times2 game, and hence find Rowan's optimal mixed strategy and the value of the game.
    [6 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    M1: row 3 is dominated by row 1 (2≤32\leq3, 5≤65\leq6, 3≤43\leq4)
    M1: column 3 is dominated by column 1 (
    4≥34\geq3, 8≥78\geq7, 3≥23\geq2)
    A1: reduced matrix
    (3672)\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 6 \\ 7 & 2 \end{pmatrix}
    M1: row 1 with probability
    pp, equate expected pay-offs, 7−4p=2+4p7-4p=2+4p
    A1:
    p=58p=\frac58, so row 1 with probability 58\frac58 and row 2 with probability 38\frac38
    A1: value of the game is
    92\frac92
    (b)
    Find Colin's optimal mixed strategy for the reduced game. Show that if Rowan uses the strategy found in part (a), Colin does worse by playing column 3.
    [6 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    M1: Colin plays column 1 with probability qq; expected pay-offs against rows 1 and 2
    A1:
    3q+6(1−q)=6−3q3q+6(1-q)=6-3q and 7q+2(1−q)=2+5q7q+2(1-q)=2+5q
    M1: equates them,
    6−3q=2+5q6-3q=2+5q
    A1:
    q=12q=\frac12, so columns 1 and 2 each with probability 12\frac12 and column 3 never
    M1: expected pay-off to Rowan against column 3 when Rowan plays
    (58,38,0)\left(\frac58,\frac38,0\right), 4×58+8×384\times\frac58+8\times\frac38
    A1:
    112>92\frac{11}{2}>\frac92, so playing column 3 gives Rowan more, and so is worse for Colin

    Total for question 4: 12 marks

End of questions

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