Zero-sum games, play-safe strategies and saddle points

Zero-sum games, play-safe strategies and saddle points Test

Spec 5.1–2 · Edexcel A-Level Further Maths: Subtopic test

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10 questions, 27 marks

Edexcel A-Level Further Maths

Zero-sum games, play-safe strategies and saddle points

Total 27 marks

Name

Class

Date

  1. 1
    Rose and Colin play a zero-sum game. Rose chooses a row and Colin chooses a column, and the pay-off matrix shows Rose's winnings: (172456203)\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 7 & 2 \\ 4 & 5 & 6 \\ 2 & 0 & 3 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Which row is Rose's play-safe strategy?
    [1 mark]
    • ARow 1
    • BRow 2
    • CRow 3
    • DShe has none, because play-safe strategies only exist when a game has no stable solution
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: B
    (b)
    Which column is Colin's play-safe strategy?
    [1 mark]
    • AColumn 3
    • BColumn 2
    • CColumn 1
    • DHe has none, because the column maxima are all different
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: C
    (c)
    Show that the game has a stable solution and state its value.
    [2 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    B1: row minima 1,4,01,4,0 so maximin =4=4; column maxima 4,7,64,7,6 so minimax =4=4
    B1: maximin
    == minimax so the game is stable (saddle point at row 2, column 1), value 44 to Rose
    Accept: the saddle point
    44 identified as the least entry in its row and the greatest in its column

    Total for question 1: 4 marks

  2. 2
    Rose and Colin play a different zero-sum game, with Rose choosing the rows and Colin the columns. Rose's pay-off matrix is (−13−22−34)\begin{pmatrix} -1 & 3 & -2 \\ 2 & -3 & 4 \end{pmatrix}.
    (a)
    Rose plays row 2 and Colin plays column 2. What is Colin's pay-off?
    [1 mark]
    • A33
    • B−3-3
    • C00
    • D22
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: A
    (b)
    Both players use their play-safe strategies. What is Rose's pay-off?
    [1 mark]
    • A−2-2
    • B22
    • C11
    • D−1-1
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    Answer: D
    (c)
    Explain why this game has no stable solution.
    [2 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    B1: row minima −2,−3-2,-3 so maximin =−2=-2
    B1: column maxima
    2,3,42,3,4 so minimax =2=2; since −2≠2-2\neq2 there is no stable solution
    Accept: no entry that is both the least in its row and the greatest in its column

    Total for question 2: 4 marks

  3. 3
    Two online retailers, Aria and Bolt, each choose one of three advertising strategies. The pay-off matrix shows Aria's gain in market share (percentage points) for each pair of strategies, where Aria chooses the rows and Bolt the columns, and xx is a constant: (4264x5170)\begin{pmatrix} 4 & 2 & 6 \\ 4 & x & 5 \\ 1 & 7 & 0 \end{pmatrix}. Any gain for Aria is an equal loss for Bolt.
    (a)
    Given that x=1x=1, find each retailer's play-safe strategy and show that the game has no stable solution.
    [3 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    B1: row minima 2,1,02,1,0 so Aria's maximin is 22 (row 1)
    B1: column maxima
    4,7,64,7,6 so Bolt's minimax is 44 (column 1)
    B1:
    2≠42\neq4 so there is no stable solution
    (b)
    Find the set of values of xx for which the game has a stable solution, and state the value of the game.
    [4 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    B1: column maxima are 44, at least 77 (as max⁡(7,x)≥7\max(7,x)\ge7) and 66, so minimax =4=4 for every xx
    M1: the row minima of rows 1 and 3 are
    22 and 00, so maximin =4=4 needs row 2 to have minimum 44, i.e. min⁡(4,x,5)=4\min(4,x,5)=4
    A1:
    x≥4x\ge4
    B1: saddle point at row 2, column 1; value
    44 to Aria

    Total for question 3: 7 marks

  4. 4
    Two political parties, Green and Blue, each choose one of three campaign strategies. The pay-off matrix shows the net change in the number of seats won by Green, where Green chooses the rows and Blue the columns: (2−34−13102−2)\begin{pmatrix} 2 & -3 & 4 \\ -1 & 3 & 1 \\ 0 & 2 & -2 \end{pmatrix}. Every seat Green gains is a seat Blue loses.
    (a)
    Find the play-safe strategy for each party, show that the game has no stable solution, and state the outcome if both parties play safe.
    [6 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    B1: Green's row minima −3,−1,−2-3,-1,-2
    M1: maximin
    =−1=-1, so Green plays row 2
    B1: Blue's column maxima
    2,3,42,3,4
    M1: minimax
    =2=2, so Blue plays column 1
    R1:
    −1≠2-1\neq2 so there is no stable solution
    A1: both play safe: row 2, column 1 gives
    −1-1, so Green loses one seat and Blue gains one
    (b)
    Green believes that Blue will play safe. Justify whether Green should also play safe, and explain what happens next if each party keeps reacting to the other. State what this shows about the game.
    [6 marks]
    Show the mark scheme

    Mark scheme

    B1: against column 1 (entries 2,−1,02,-1,0) Green's best reply is row 1, giving +2+2, which is better than −1-1
    M1: Blue's best reply to row 1 (entries
    2,−3,42,-3,4) is column 2
    A1: giving Green
    −3-3
    M1: Green's best reply to column 2 (entries
    −3,3,2-3,3,2) is row 2
    A1: Blue's best reply to row 2 (entries
    −1,3,1-1,3,1) is column 1, which returns to the play-safe pair
    R1: every pure choice can be exploited and the cycle never settles, so there is no stable solution; a play-safe strategy is predictable and a mixed strategy is needed

    Total for question 4: 12 marks

End of questions

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